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 .Let ¤ be a cooperative TU game and ¤ s ¤ y ¤ be a decomposition of ¤ as a1 2
 .difference of two convex games ¤ and ¤ . Then the core C ¤ of the game ¤ has a1 2
 .  .  .similar decomposition C ¤ s C ¤ ] C ¤ , where ] denotes the Minkowski1 2
difference. We prove such a decomposition as a consequence of two claims: the
core of a game is equal to the superdifferential of its continuation, known as the
Choquet integral, and the superdifferential of a difference of two concave func-
tions equals the Minkowski difference of corresponding superdifferentials.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The core of an n-person cooperative game is the set of all feasible
payments that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. The
core is a compact polyhedron, possibly empty.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the structure of the core. We
show how the core is built from some elementary objects, simplexes. Any
game is a linear combination of simple games. The core of a simple game
is the unit simplex in the corresponding subspace. If a game is a linear
combination of simple games with nonnegative coefficients such games
.are called totally monotone games , then its core equals the same linear
combination of the simplexes. Sum of sets is understood as the Minkowski
sum.
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Our main result is an extension of this assertion to any games. Let ¤ be
 .a cooperative game. It can be represented the inverse Mobius transformÈ
in a form ¤ s  m A¤ y  n B¤ , with some nonnegative coefficientsA A B B
A B  .m , n , where ¤ denotes a simple game with a coalition A, i.e., ¤ S s 1A A
 .if A ; S and 0 otherwise. Then the core C ¤ has a similar representation
C ¤ s [ m AC ¤ ] [ n BC ¤ . .  .  . .  .A A B B
Here, [ and ] are the Minkowski sum and the Minkowski difference;
 .C ¤ is the core of a simple game ¤ .A A
The following example exhibits the result.
 . < <EXAMPLE. Consider the following three-persons game: ¤ S s S y 1,
< <if S / B. The game ¤ has the following representation via simple games:
¤ s ¤ q ¤ q ¤ y ¤ .1, 24 1 , 34 2 , 34 1 , 2, 34
 .  . <The core of the game ¤ is the triangle C ¤ s x , x , x x q x q x s1 2 3 1 2 3
4  .2, 0 F x F 1 . The core of the game ¤ is the simplex trianglei 1, 2, 34
 .  . < 4C ¤ s x , x , x x q x q x s 1, x G 0 . The core of the game1, 2,34 1 2 3 1 2 3 i
 .  .¤ is a simplex segment with vertices 1 and 1 C ¤ si, j4 i j i, j4
 . < 4x , x , x x q x s 1, x , x G 0, x s 0 .1 2 3 i j i j 1, 2, 34_i, j4
 .  .  .The Minkowski sum of three segments C ¤ [ C ¤ [ C ¤1, 24 1, 34 2, 34
equals the hexagon whose vertices are the coordinate permutations of the
 .  .  .vector 2, 1, 0 . The Minkowski sum of two triangles C ¤ [ C ¤ is1, 2, 34
 .  .  .equal to the same hexagon. So, there holds C ¤ [ C ¤ s C ¤1, 2, 34 1, 24
 .  .[ C ¤ [ C ¤ , and we get the following decomposition of the core1, 34 2, 34
C ¤ s C ¤ [ C ¤ [ C ¤ ] C ¤ . .  .  .  .  .1, 24 1 , 34 2 , 34 1 , 2, 34
Figure 1 illustrates this example.
Our main result is a consequence of two important claims. First Pro-
.position 3 , the core of a game equals the superdifferential of one of its
 .continuations, known as the Choquet integral. Second Lemma 1 , the
superdifferential of the difference of two concave functions equals the
Minkowski difference of the corresponding superdifferentials a kind of
.reversion of the Moreau]Rockafellar rule .
In view of received representation of the core, we can say that the core
as the solution concept possesses a kind of additivity property, similar to
that the Shapley vector possesses.
Notations: V is a finite dimensional vector space; V * is its dual. A
 .  .homogeneous function f : V * “ R is a function such that f a p s a f p ,
 4for any p g V * and a G 0. N s 1, . . . , n . 1 , S ; N, denotes the vectorS
in R N whose ith coordinate equals 1 if i g S and 0 otherwise. The
accordance S “ 1 , S ; N, allows to identify the lattice 2 N with the set ofS
 4N N  N .vertices of the unit cube 0, 1 ; R . Given a linear function x g R *,
 .  .x S s x 1 s  x denotes the value of x in the corresponding vertexS ig S i
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FIG. 1.
  N .U <  . 4of the unit cube. D s x g R x N s 1 is the unit simplex inN q
 N .  < 4R *. l A s la a g A , l g R , A ; V.q
2. MINKOWSKI SUM AND MINKOWSKI DIFFERENCE
Consider a finite dimensional vector space V. It is possible to define
some operations on the set of its subsets, P.
The Minkowski sum of sets A and B g P is defined by the rule
< 4A [ B s a q b a g A , b g B .
 4This operation is associative and commutative, A [ 0 s A, and A [ B
 .s B. The Minkowski sum of convex sets is a convex set. P, [ is a
semigroup, but it is not a group: there is no inverse operation to the
Minkowski sum. However, it is possible to define a partial inversion by the
rule
< 4A ] B s z g V z [ B : A . 1 .
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 w xThis operation is said to be the Minkowski difference. Matheron 4
 . .defined the difference of sets slightly different from Eq. 1 .
Although Minkowski difference is a partial inversion of Minkowski sum,
it possesses some properties of difference: A ] B is equal to the maximal
 .set C for which C [ B ; A. The equality A ] B [ B s A holds iff there
exists a set C with A s C [ B. In such a case, the set B is said to be the
Minkowski summand to A. If A is a convex set, then the Minkowski
difference A ] B is a convex set for any B. The Minkowski difference is a
monotone operation, i.e., from B > C follows A ] B ; A ] C for any A.
There also holds
A ] B [ C s A ] B ] C. 2 .  .  .
 . In fact, the set Z s A ] B [ C is the maximal set for which Z [ B [
.  .C ; A holds. The set Z9 s A ] B ] C is the maximal set for which
 .Z9 [ C ; A ] B. In view of the inclusion Z9 [ C [ B ; A ] B [ B ;
A, there holds Z9 ; Z.
On the other hand, due to associativity and commutativity of the
 .Minkowski sum, there holds Z [ C [ B ; A. Therefore, the inclusion
Z [ C ; A ] B holds. Due to the maximality Z9 with respect to the
inclusion Z9 [ C ; A ] B, we get Z ; Z9. That yields the equality.
There is a close relation between convex sets and concave functions: let
 .A be a nonempty compact in V, and define a function f A; ? on the dual
space V * by the rule
f A; p s inf p x , p g V *. 3 .  .  .
xgA
 . wThe function f A; ? is said to be the support function of A. In the
 .  .literature, usually the function s: V * “ R, s A; p s sup p x is saidx g A
 .to be the support function. For us, it will be convenient to use Eq. 3 . s
 .  . xand f are related via the equality f p s ys yp .
The support function is homogeneous and concave. On the other hand,
every homogeneous concave function f : V * “ R is the support function of
a nonempty compact in V. Such a set can be explicitly determined. Given a
 .homogeneous concave function f on V *, a set › f in V of the form
<› f [ x g V x p G f p ;p g V * 4 4 .  .  .  .
 .is said to be the superdifferential of f. Obviously, the set › f is a convex
compact. The operations f and › are dual. The exact statement is the
following well-known theorem, which is a form of the Minkowski duality in
 w x.convex analysis see, for example, Rockafellar 5 .
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 .  .THEOREM 1 Duality . a Let f be a homogeneous conca¤e function on
 .  .   . .V *. Then › f / B and f ? s f › f ; ? .
 .   ..b Let A be a nonempty con¤ex compact in V. Then › f A; ? s A.
 .The part a can be slightly generalized: let f be a homogeneous
Ãfunction on V *. Let f be its concavification,
Ãf p [ inf x p , 5 .  .  .
xGf
Ãwhere x is a linear function on V *, i.e., x g V. In other words, f is the
function whose ordinate set is the convex hull of the ordinate set of f.
Because of this, the formula
Ãf p s sup a f p 6 .  .  . i i
i
holds, where the supremum is taken over all possible representations p as
a convex combination: p s  a p , a G 0,  a s 1. However, we shouldi i i i i i
take care of the possibility that inf and sup may not achieve: in the first
case, there is no linear function x such that x G f ; in the second case,
 .there is a convex combination 0 s  a p such that  a f p ) 0. Ini i i i i i
Ãsuch a case, we set f [ q‘.
 .Define the superdifferential of a homogeneous function f by Eq. 4 .
Ã .Obviously, › f s B if and only if f s q‘.
ÃPROPOSITION 1. Let f be a homogeneous function on V * and f / q‘.
Ã Ã .  .   ..Then › f s › f and f › f s f.
Ã Ã .  .Proof. As f G f , there holds › f ; › f . On the other hand, let
 .  .  .  .x g › f , i.e., x p G f p for any p g V *. By the formula 5 , we have
Ã Ã .  .  .x p G f p and hence x g › f . Due to concavity of f , we conclude
Ã Ã .   ..   ..Theorem 1 the equality f › f s f › f s f. Q.E.D.
 w x.The following properties of the support function see, for example, 2, 5
will be of use.
 .  .1. f a A; ? s af A; ? , a ) 0.
 .  .  .2. f A [ B; ? s f A; ? q f B; ? .
 .  .3. A > B « f A; ? F f B; ? ; with convex B, there holds A > B
 .  .m f A; ? F f B; ? .
As A ] B equals the maximal set C with C [ B ; A, we conclude that
 .f A ] B is the minimal homogeneous concave function f such that
 .  .  .f q f B G f A . In view of Proposition 1, this yields that f A ] B is
 .  .the concavification of f A y f B . This establishes the following.
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PROPOSITION 2. Let A and B be nonempty con¤ex compacts. Then
n .   .  ..   .  ..f A ] B s f A y f B and A ] B s › f A y f B .
Let us deduce some other consequences from these propositions.
LEMMA 1. Let ¤ and ¤ be conca¤e homogeneous functions. Then1 2
a › ¤ q ¤ s › ¤ [ › ¤ , 7 .  .  .  .  .1 2 1 2
b › ¤ y ¤ s › ¤ ] › ¤ . 8 .  .  .  .  .1 2 1 2
 . w x.Proof. a This is known as the Moreau]Rockafellar rule 5 .
 .  .b Because of concavity of ¤ and ¤ , we have ¤ s f A , ¤ s1 2 1 2
 .f B for some nonempty compacts A, B. Then, by Proposition 2, there
holds
› ¤ y ¤ s › f A y f B s A ] B. 9 .  .  .  . .1 2
  ..  .   ..  .By the duality theorem, A s › f A s › ¤ and B s › f B s › ¤ .1 2
 .  .This and Eq. 9 yield Eq. 8 . Q.E.D.
COROLLARY 1. In the case of con¤ex compacts A, B, C, the following
properties hold:
A s A [ C ] C , 10 .  .
A [ C ] B [ C s A ] B. 11 .  .  .
COROLLARY 2. Gi¤en sets A and B, the set B is the Minkowski summand
 .  .to A if and only if the difference f A; ? y f B; ? is a conca¤e function,
 .  .  .and hence there holds f A ] B; ? s f A; ? y f B; ? .
COROLLARY 3. Let V be n-dimensional ¤ector space. Let A, B be con¤ex
compacts in V. Then A ] B / B if and only if , for any p , . . . , p g V * with0 n
n p s 0, holdsis0 i
n
f A; p y f B ; p F 0. 12 .  .  . . i i
is0
Proof. From Propositions 1 and 2 follows that A ] B s B if and only
n  .  ..if f A y f B s q‘. The latter is equivalent to the existence of the
convex combination 0 s  a p such thati i i
a f A; p y f B ; p s f A; a p y f B ; a p ) 0. .  .  .  . .  . i i i i i i i
i i
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By the Caratheodory theorem, it is possible to restrict ourselves to convex
combinations of at most n q 1 vectors. Q.E.D.
3. GAMES AND CORES
 . NWe recall that a cooperative TU game is a function ¤ : 2 “ R,
 .  4satisfying ¤ B s 0. Elements of the set N s 1, . . . , n are interpreted as
 .players; subsets of N are coalitions; the number ¤ S is the gain of the
 .coalition S ; N. The core C ¤ of a game ¤ is the set of all feasible
payments that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. The
 .  N .core C ¤ is the following subset in R *
N <C ¤ s x g R * x N s ¤ N , x S G ¤ S , S ; N . 13 4 .  .  .  .  .  .  .
The core is a compact convex polyhedron, possibly empty, of dimension at
most n y 1.
The definition of the core of a cooperative game recalls the definition of
the superdifferential of a homogeneous function given in the previous
 N .section with V s R *.
Consider a game ¤ as a function on the linear space R N. Precisely, it is
 4Ndefined only on a part of the space: on vertices of the unit cube 0, 1 ;
N  . NR . Given coalition S ; N, assign the value ¤ S to the vector 1 g R ,S
whose ith coordinate equals 1 if i g S and 0 otherwise. We also assign the
 .value y¤ N to the vector y1 .N
In order to get the core of a cooperative game as the superdifferential of
a homogeneous function, we shall, in a proper way, continue a game ¤ to a
function ¤ on the whole R N. It occurs that a proper continuation existsÄ
and is known as the Choquet integral. For axiomatization of Choquet
w x .integral, see, for example, Schmeidler 6 . The continuation is based on a
nice decomposition of R N into cones. These cones are constructed by
chains of coalitions.
 4A decreasing sequence of coalitions W s S > ??? > S is said to be a0 k
chain. It will be convenient always to assume S s N. To the chain W we0
relate the cone spanned by the line R1 and rays R 1 , i s 1, . . . , k,N q Si
<Con W s a 1 a g R, a G 0, i s 1, . . . , k . .  i S 0 i 5i
i
Cones that correspond to maximal chains have the full dimension. There
are n! full dimensional cones. The space R N is equal to the union of all
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cones and relative interiors of different cones do not intersect. Let
p g R N. Consider p as a function on N and let c - c - ??? - c be its0 1 k
ordered values and set
<S [ i g N p G c . 4j i j
 .Then p s c 1 q  c y c 1 belongs to the relative interior of0 N jG1 j jy1 Sj
 .  4 k Con W , where W s S > ??? > S . The expression p s c 1 q  c0 k 0 N js1 j
.y c 1 , where c ) c for all j, is called the canonical form of p.jy1 S j jy1j
Define the continuation ¤ of the game ¤ on R N by the ruleÄ
k
¤ p s c ? ¤ N q c y c ¤ S , 14 .  .  .  .Ä  .0 j jy1 j
js1
where p is written in the canonical form.
 .  .From this follows that the equality ¤ 1 s ¤ S holds for every S ,Ä S j jj
 .  .j s 0, . . . , k, ¤ y1 s y¤ N , and ¤ is a linear function on each coneÄ ÄN
 .Con W . The following proposition establishes the importance of this
continuation operation.
PROPOSITION 3. Let ¤ be a game and let ¤ be its continuation on R N.Ä
Then
C ¤ s › ¤ . .  .Ä
 .  .Proof. The inclusion C ¤ > › ¤ holds due to the fact that any linearÄ
 .  .inequality in the definition of C ¤ arises also in the definition of › ¤ .Ä
 .  .  .Reversely, let x g C ¤ . Consider an inequality x p G ¤ p in the defini-Ä
 .  .tion › ¤ . Let p belong to a cone Con W . Functions x and ¤ are linearÄ Ä
on this cone. The inequality holds at the generators 1 , 1 , and theN Sj
equality holds at y1 . Therefore, the inequality still holds in p. Q.E.D.N
So, we have shown that the core of a cooperative game ¤ coincides with
the superdifferential of the homogeneous function ¤ . In view of this andÄ
the duality theorem, the following definition looks natural.
DEFINITION 1. A game ¤ is said to be the con¤ex if ¤ is a concaveÄ
function.
We call such games convex, and not concave which may seem more
.logical , because later it comes out that such games are convex due to the
 .Shapley 1971 definition.
 .Exploiting the relation between cores of TU games and superdifferen-
tials of homogeneous function, we receive the following.
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PROPOSITION 4. Let ¤ and ¤ be con¤ex games. Then1 2
a C ¤ q ¤ s C ¤ [ C ¤ , 15 .  .  .  .  .1 2 1 2
b C ¤ y ¤ s C ¤ ] C ¤ . 16 .  .  .  .  .1 2 1 2
Proof. Because of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, and due to the linearity
;of the operation , the following sequence of equalities holds
;a C ¤ q ¤ s › ¤ q ¤ .  .  . .1 2 1 2
s › ¤ q ¤ s › ¤ [ › ¤ s C ¤ [ C ¤ , .  . .  .Ä Ä Ä Ä .1 2 1 2 1 2
17 .
;b C ¤ y ¤ s › ¤ y ¤ .  .  . .1 2 1 2
s › ¤ y ¤ s › ¤ ] › ¤ s C ¤ ] C ¤ . .  . .  .Ä Ä Ä Ä .1 2 1 2 1 2
Q.E.D.
4. DECOMPOSITION OF GAMES AND CORES
w x.It is well known 8 that any game can be represented as a linear
combination of simple games. Here, we show that the core possesses a
similar decomposition via the cores of simple games.
With any nonempty coalition A ; N is related the simple game una-
.  .  .nimity game ¤ that has payoffs ¤ S s 1 if A ; S, and ¤ S s 0A A A
 .otherwise. The core of a simple game ¤ is the set C ¤ s D , whereA A A
 <  . 4D s x g D x A s 1 . D is the face of the unit simplex D withA N A N
vertices in the set A.
The set of games is a linear space. The set of simple games is the basis
of this linear space: any game is a linear combination with possibly
. Nnegative coefficients of simple games. In fact, let m: 2 “ R be a
 .  .function such that m B s 0. Such functions are called mass functions.
Define a game of the form
¤ s m S ¤ . 18 .  .m S
S;N
 .From Eq. 18 follows that
¤ T s m T , T ; N. 19 .  .  .m
S;T
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The transformation from the games to the mass functions, defined by the
rule
< <SyT¤m S s y1 ¤ T , 20 .  .  .  .
T;S
is said to be the in¤erse Mobius transform.È
w x. ¤By the method of inclusion and exclusion 3 , there holds ¤ ’ ¤ .m
Consider games with nonnegative Mobius inverse. Any such game is saidÈ
to be the totally monotone game. From the following lemma and that the
sum of convex games is a convex game, we get that any totally monotone
game is convex in accord with Definition 1.
LEMMA 2. Gi¤en A ; N, the simple game ¤ is con¤ex, i.e., the functionA
¤ is conca¤e.ÄA
Proof. Let ¤ be a simple game, A ; N. Show thatA
&
¤ p s min p . 21 .  .A i
igA
 .By Eq. 14 there holds
k&
¤ p s c ? ¤ N q c y c ¤ S , 22 .  .  .  . .A 0 A j jy1 A j
js1
 < 4where c - c - ??? - c are ordered values of p, S [ i g N p G c , j0 1 k j i j
 .s 1, . . . , k. Let c s min p . Then A ; S if j F a and hence ¤ S sa ig A i j A j
 .1, j F a, and A o S if j ) a and hence ¤ S s 0, j ) a. Therefore, wej A j
have
a&
¤ p s c q c y c s c s min p . .  .A 0 j jy1 a i
igAjs1
Given A ; N, the function min p is concave as the minimum of linearig A i
 .coordinate functions. Q.E.D.
.From this lemma and Proposition 4a , we get the structure of the core of
a totally monotone game.
COROLLARY 4. Let ¤ be a totally monotone game and m¤ be its MobiusÈ
in¤erse. Then
C ¤ s m¤ S ? D . .  .[ S
S;N
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Let now ¤ be an arbitrary game and m¤ be its Mobius inverse. DefineÈ
two games
¤qs m¤ S ? ¤ , 23 .  . S
¤  .S , m S )0
and
¤ys ym¤ S ? ¤ . 24 .  . . S
¤  .S , m S -0
Games ¤q and ¤y are totally monotone games and ¤ s ¤qy ¤y.
Define the following two sets: the upper core
Cq ¤ s C ¤q s m¤ S ? D , 25 .  .  .  .[ S
¤  .S , m S )0
and the lower core
Cy ¤ s C ¤y s ym¤ S ? D . 26 .  .  .  . .[ S
¤  .S , m S -0
 4The sum over empty set equals, by convention, 0 .
Because of Proposition 4 and Corollary 4, we get our main result.
THEOREM 2. Let ¤ be a game. Then there holds
C ¤ s Cq ¤ ] Cy ¤ . 27 .  .  .  .
w x  . q .  y ..Remark. Vasil'ev 10 studied a set H ¤ s C ¤ [ yC ¤ , which
 .looks similar to Eq. 27 , but it is different. For totally monotone games
 y . .  .C ¤ s 0 , the set H ¤ coincides with the core, but this coincidence
w xholds only for totally monotone games. In 10 , Vasil'ev proved that there
 .  .exists a convex game ¤ 9 with C ¤ 9 s H ¤ . This can be easily seen from
 .Proposition 4: given a coalition A, define the following game w , w B sA A
  .y1 if B l A / B and 0 otherwise. The game w is convex w p sÄA A
.  .ymax p and there holds C w s yD .ag A a A A
Let now ¤ be a game and m¤ be its Mobius inverse. Define the followingÈ
game
¤ s ym¤ S ? w , 28 .  . .y S
¤  .S , m S -0
q q  .and set ¤ 9 [ ¤ q ¤ , where ¤ is defined by Eq. 23 . The game ¤ 9 is they
convex game as sum of convex games. By Proposition 4, there holds
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 .  q.  .  .  .C ¤ 9 s C ¤ [ C ¤ . Because of C w s yD , we have C ¤ sy S S y
 y. y .  .  .yC ¤ s yC ¤ . That yields the equality C ¤ 9 s H ¤ .
To summarize, we can say that the core as the solution concept pos-
sesses a kind of additivity: given a game ¤ being represented in a form
 .  . ¤ s  m A ¤ y  n B ¤ , with some nonnegative coefficients massA A B B
.  .functions m and n , the core C ¤ has a similar representation
C ¤ s [ m A C ¤ ] [ n B C ¤ . .  .  .  .  . .  .A A B B
5. GAMES WITH NONEMPTY CORES
Let us start with a characterization of convex games.
PROPOSITION 5. Let ¤ : 2 N “ R be a game. The following statements are
equi¤alent.
 .i A game ¤ is con¤ex, i.e., the function ¤ is a homogeneous conca¤eÄ
function on R N.
 . Nii ¤ is a supermodular function on the lattice 2 , i.e., for any
 .  .  .  .S, T ; N, there holds ¤ S q ¤ T F ¤ S l T q ¤ S j T .
 .  .   . . Niii ¤ p s f C ¤ , p for any p g R .Ä
 . q .  . y .iv There holds C ¤ s C ¤ [ C ¤ .
 .  .Proof. The equivalence iv m iii follows from Theorem 2 and Propo-
 .  .sition 2. The equivalence i m iii follows from Proposition 3 and Theo-
rem 1.
 .  .i « ii . Let S and T be subsets of N. Then there exists a maximal
chain W that contains sets S l T , S, and S j T. Due to the definition of
¤ , there is a linear function, say y, that coincides with ¤ on the coneÄ
 .Con W . Because of concavity of ¤ , there holdsÄ
¤ 1 s ¤ T F y 1 . .  .  .Ä T T
 .  .  .  .  .  .So, we have ¤ S j T q ¤ S l T s y 1 q y 1 s y 1 q y 1S j T S l T S T
 .  .G ¤ S q ¤ T .
 .  .ii « i . The concavity of ¤ will be established if we show that forÄ
N  .any p g R , there exists a linear function x such that x G ¤ and x p sÄ
 .¤ p . We define such a function x explicitly.Ä
N  .Let p g R . Pick a full-dimensional cone Con W to which p belongs.
 4  .  .  .Let W s S > ??? > S , S s N, S s B. Set x 1 s ¤ N and x 10 n 0 n N Sj
 . Ns ¤ S , j s 1, . . . , n. We complete the definition by linearity on R . Inj
 .  .  .  .  .particular, we have x p s c x 1 q  c y c x 1 s c ¤ N q0 N jG1 j jy1 S 0j
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 .  .  .  . c y c ¤ S s ¤ p , where p s c 1 q  c y c 1 . TheÄjG1 j jy1 j 0 N jG1 j jy1 Sj
 .  .inequality x G ¤ will be followed if we will check that x 1 G ¤ 1 forÄ ÄS S
any S ; N.
Proceed by induction. Given S ; N, consider the greatest k such that
S ; S . Then we have the inequalityk
¤ S F ¤ S j S q ¤ S l S y ¤ S . .  .  .  .kq1 kq1 kq1
Further, S j S s S and, by induction on the number of elementskq1 k
 .  .S l S , there holds ¤ S l S F x S l S . So, we havej kq1 kq1
¤ S j S q ¤ S l S y ¤ S .  .  .kq1 kq1 kq1
s x S j S q x S l S y x S s x S . .  .  .  .kq1 kq1 kq1
 .  .  .  .  .Thus, ¤ S s ¤ S F x S for any S ; N and ¤ N s x N . Q.E.D.Ä Ä
w xRemarks. Recall that Shapley 8 called those games convex that satisfy
 .  .the supermodularity property: for any S, T ; N, there holds ¤ S q ¤ T
 .  .F ¤ S l T q ¤ S j T . This proposition shows the equivalence of the
supermodularity to Definition 1.
w x  .Using other methods, Schmeidler 6 received the property i and
w x  .Vasil'ev 9 received the property iii .
From a geometric point of view, the proposition says that a game ¤ is
y . q .convex if and only if C ¤ is the Minkowski summand to C ¤ .
A family B ; 2 N of sets and a system of weights l G 0, S g B, withS
 l s 1, i g N, is said to be the balanced family.S 2 i S
 .A game ¤ is said to be balanced if for any balanced family B, l , there
holds
l ¤ S F ¤ N . 29 .  .  . S
SgB
w x w xBondareva 1 and Shapley 7 proved that the core is nonempty if and only
if a game is balanced.
Here we employ Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 to show that the
 .nonemptyness of the core is equivalent to the fulfilment 29 for balanced
families that contain at most n q 1 sets.
 .THEOREM 3. Let ¤ be a game. Then the core, C ¤ , is nonempty if and
only if for any sets S , . . . , S and numbers a , . . . , a G 0 with n a 1 s1 n 1 n js1 j S j
1 , there holdsN
n
a ¤ S F ¤ N . 30 .  . . i j
js1
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 .  .  .Proof. By Proposition 3, the equality C ¤ s › ¤ holds. › ¤ / B iffÄ Ä
n .¤ / q‘. The latter holds iff the convex hull of the ordinate set of ¤Ä Ä
does not coincide with the whole R N = R.
Due to the definition of ¤ , the convex hull of the ordinate set of ¤Ä Ä
  ..coincides with the cone generated by the set of vectors 1 , ¤ S , S :S
  ..4 NN, y1 , y¤ N . The latter cone does not coincide with R = R iff Eq.N
 .30 holds. Q.E.D.
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